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for discriminatory behaviour by employees if they can prove that they “took 
such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the employee from doing 
that act, or from doing in the course of his employment acts of that description”.
It is diffi cult to know what employers must do to establish a comparable defence in 
relation to the Protection from Harassment Act, but it seems likely that they will need 
to be proactive in their approach to this issue by widening the scope of anti-harass-
ment policies, amending disciplinary procedure to clarify when and how a harasser 
will be disciplined, and providing training for managers on how to deal effectively with 
harassment and handle complaints. 
 
Sam Middlemiss
The Robert Gordon University
Liability for Harm Suffered in Institutional Care: 
M v Hendron 
A. INTRODUCTION
Four years ago, in the English case of Lister v Hesley Hall,1 the House of Lords 
substantially redrew the boundaries of vicarious liability for an employee’s inten-
tional wrong-doing. Previously employers’ liability had been regarded as contingent 
upon whether the wrong-doer had acted with the scope of his or her employment.2 
That meant that, where, as in Lister, the alleged wrong involved a carer intention-
ally harming an individual under the employer’s charge, the test almost invariably 
excluded the employer from liability. As was said in an earlier case, such conduct was 
“far removed from an unauthorised mode” of carrying out the employee’s duties,3 and 
there was deep disinclination to look upon “an independent act of self-indulgence or 
self-gratifi cation” as having been committed in the scope of employment.4 In Lister 
the court confronted this problem by refocusing the test upon whether the wrong was 
“so closely connected with his employment that it would be fair and just to hold the 
[employer] vicariously liable”,5 and on that basis found the employers of the warden of 
a school boarding house vicariously liable for his abuse of children in his care. 
The recent Outer House case, M v Hendron,6 is one of the fi rst Scots cases since 
1  [2002] 1 AC 215.
2 The so-called “Salmond test” which derived originally from J Salmond, Law of Torts, 1st edn (1907) at 
83. 
3 Per Lady Butler-Sloss in Trotman v North Yorkshire County Council [1999] IRLR 98 at 101, (overruled 
in Lister). See also Power v Central SMT Co Ltd 1949 SC 376 per Lord President Cooper at 380: “it 
appears to me that if the servant’s caprice might suffi ce to take an act out of the course of his employ-
ment, much more will his private malice or spite, even if the source of that malice or spite is to be found 
in a transaction intrinsic to his employment.”
4 Per Chadwick LJ in Trotman at 102. 
5 Lister v Hesley Hall [2002] 1 AC 215 per Lord Steyn at para 28. 
6 2005 SLT 1122. 
EdinLR Vol 10 pp 309–316
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Lister to consider issues of vicarious liability in the context of institutional care. Like 
Lister, it concerned an action for damages arising out of abuse suffered by a pupil in 
a residential school, but there was a less straightforward legal relationship between 
the defenders and the alleged perpetrator of the abuse – a member of the Order of 
monks which staffed the school. In the event this case provides a useful discussion of 
the issues relating to vicarious liability, non delegable duties of care, and the primary 
liability of public authorities. 
B. THE FACTS OF M V HENDRON
The pursuer in M v Hendron had been committed to a residential “approved” school 
in 1963, aged only nine years old, and had remained there for three years. The school 
was staffed mainly by monks from the Order of De La Salle Brothers. The pursuer 
alleged that he had suffered physical abuse chiefl y at the hands of two of the brothers, 
one of whom, Brother Benedict, had recently been convicted of assaulting the pursuer 
over a period between 1963 and 1964. The pursuer’s action was brought against a 
multiplicity of defenders. Decree in absence for £50,000 against Brother Benedict 
was readily granted, but damages were also claimed from the Congregation of De 
La Salle Brothers, the school managers, and the Lord Advocate as representing the 
successor to the Scottish Education Department (SED) which had responsibility for 
such schools at the relevant time. The issue before the court was whether proof before 
answer should be allowed as to the arguments of primary and vicarious liability made 
against these remaining defenders. (This article will not consider the issues of time bar 
which were also given extended consideration.7) 
C. VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS
In M v Hendron the court accepted, on the authority of Lister, that there could in 
principle be a suffi ciently close connection between child abuse and the work of 
those employed specifi cally to care for children8 to justify imposing liability on the 
employers.9 To that extent it was not necessary to consider problems such as those 
raised by recent North American case-law10 as to liability for clergy who exploit their 
general pastoral role to perpetrate abuse upon children or vulnerable adults. (One 
of the leading Canadian cases in this category, John Doe v Bennett,11 was cited to 
the court in M v Hendron.) The point of contention in such cases has been whether 
there is a suffi cient link between the pastoral duties and the abuse to fi nd the church 
authorities vicariously liable. 
7 At paras 130-138. For discussion as to the exercise of discretion in overriding the normal rules on limita-
tion under ss 17 and 19A of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, see B v Murray 2005 
SLT 982; also C v D [2004] EWHC 534 (QB) (on the comparable English provisions). 
8 Cf E B v Order of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate 2005 SCC 60, 258 DLR (4th) 385 in which the abuse 
was committed at a residential school by the school baker – vicarious liability was not found. 
9 At para 95. On the authority of Lister in Scotland see, e.g., Sharp v Highland and Islands Fire Board 
2005 SLT 855 per Lord Macphail at para 33. 
10 For an overview see I C Lupu and R W Tuttle, “Sexual misconduct and ecclesiastical immunity” (2004) 
Brigham Young University LR 1789, in particular at 1879ff. 
11 [2004] 1 SCR 436, 2004 SCC 17.
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A greater source of diffi culty was that the alleged wrongdoer was hardly in a 
conventional employment relationship. The De La Salle Order’s current description 
of the working relationship amongst its members refers to “Christian Educators who 
live and work together in community, according to the ideals and principles of our 
founder – Saint John-Baptist De La Salle”.12 Assuming this was also how the Order 
saw itself in 1963, there was scarcely an “intention to create a binding contractual 
relationship enforceable in civil law”13 as between the monks and their Order, at least 
while the monks were living within the religious community itself. Nevertheless, it 
is open to argument that when they went out to serve in institutions such as schools 
the monks became employees of those institutions, even though they did so to follow 
their vocation rather than for profi t.14 The court appeared to accept that there might 
be a “quasi-employment” relationship between the school managers and the monks, 
although a preliminary proof was required to determine the identity and status of 
those said to be managers at the relevant time. Similarly, the SED had been involved 
in the selection, supervision and remuneration of school staff, to the extent that there 
was suffi cient basis for proof as to whether the closeness of its involvement in the 
Brothers’ work at the school gave rise to vicarious liability. On the other hand, the 
question whether the De La Salle Order itself should be found vicariously liable was 
more complex. 
The Order had entered into an agreement with the then Scottish Education Depart-
ment to provide teachers and carers for the school, in return for which the Order’s 
mother house received payment. It was not clear whether contracts of employment as 
such were issued to individuals, but the monks lived in the school and were dependent 
for support upon the school bursar. The pursuer ventured a comparison between the 
position of the Order and that of the Episcopal Corporation which had employed the 
errant priest in John Doe v Bennett.15 However, Lady Paton quite rightly dismissed this 
analogy, since the Order was not a corporation, but a form of unincorporated associa-
tion, with no legal personality independent of its members.16 But equally, this meant 
that members of the Order could not be held liable simply because a delict had been 
committed by another member.17 The joint and several liability of the members of the 
Order was dependent, fi rst, upon whether the wrongdoer was acting as the agent or 
servant of the “association”, and, if so, second, on whether at the time of the delictual 
12 As stated on the Order’s website at http://www.delasalle.org.uk/.
13 The test applied in Percy v Church of Scotland [2005] UKHL 73, per Lord Hope at para 107, in fi nding 
that an associate minister was in an employment relationship with the Church of Scotland within the 
meaning of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 Act, s 82(1).
14 In this connection, see the information pamphlet issued by the US Department of Labor, Labor Stand-
ards Division, “Employment Relationship Under the Fair Labor Standards Act”, available at  http://www. 
osha.gov/pls/epub/wageindex.download?p_fi le=F11973/WH1297.pdf : “Persons such as nuns, monks, 
priests, lay brothers, ministers, deacons, and other members of religious orders who serve pursuant to 
their religious obligations in schools, hospitals and other institutions operated by the church or religious 
order are not considered to be ‘employees’ within the meaning of the law. However, the fact that such 
a person is a member of a religious order does not preclude an employee-employer relationship with a 
State or secular institution.” 
15 [2004] 1 SCR 436, 2004 SCC 17.
16 Para 88 – as were the defenders in Gorrie v The Marist Brothers 2002 SCLR 436. 
17 See Harrison v West of Scotland Kart Club 2004 SC 615. 
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actions he was acting on its behalf and within the scope of his authority from it.18 In this 
case Lady Paton was persuaded that the errant monks had been acting as agents for 
their Order in staffi ng the school, and that the Order might therefore be found liable 
for delicts found to have been committed in the course of their agency.19 This meant 
that there were adequate grounds for the second part of the inquiry – as to whether 
in the particular circumstances of the case there was a suffi ciently close connection 
between the delict and the type of work deputed to the monks as “agents”.
Although the analysis of the relationship between a religious order and one of its 
number as one of agency is not wholly straightforward, it can probably be regarded as 
correct. The classic model of agency (as a “fi duciary relationship which exists between 
two persons one of whom expressly or impliedly consents that the other should act on 
his behalf so as to affect his relations with third parties”20) doubtless gives little sense 
of what might have been the subjective understanding between the parties in relation 
to their Christian calling. But on objective assessment the Order had entered into an 
agreement with the SED to provide services at the school, and from the perspective 
of third parties, the monks acted on its behalf in delivering those services. 
D. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND NON-DELEGABLE DUTIES OF CARE
A further matter considered by the court was whether proof should be allowed as to 
whether the SED was under a non-delegable duty of care to protect the safety of pupils. 
The concept of non-delegable duties applies where the defender is said to have been 
under a direct duty to protect the property or the person of the pursuer, notwithstanding 
that the actual cause of harm has been the actions of a third party and the defender has 
not been immediately at fault. There is thus a clear distinction to be drawn between the 
situation where an employer is vicariously liable for the wrongdoing of an employee 
and the situation were an employer is in breach of a non-delegable duty of care owed 
to the person wronged. Vicarious liability occurs when a duty arises out of the relation-
ship between employee and pursuer; the employer is liable only because the delict was 
committed in the course of the employee’s work. In contrast, a non-delegable duty 
arises out of a direct relationship between employer and pursuer.21 
Due to their onerous nature, non-delegable duties are recognised sparingly.22 It is 
settled that employers have a duty to provide for the safe operation of the workplace, and 
this cannot be evaded simply by delegating it to another employee or an  independent 
18 Para 91. See also Harrison v West of Scotland Kart Club 2004 SC 615 per Lord Marnoch at para 23. 
19 On vicarious liability of a principal for the delicts of an agent, see The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia, vol 15 (1995), para 244; A Barron, “Vicarious liability for employees and agents” 2004 
SLT (News) 91; F M B Reynolds et al, Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency, 17th edn (2001) at paras 8–176-
8–177.
20 F M B Reynolds et al, Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency, 17th edn (2001) at para 1-001 
21 See J A Weir, A Casebook on Tort, 10th edn (2004) 292. The distinction between non-delegable duties 
and vicarious liability is clearly made in New South Wales v Lepore, note 26 below, and in the Canadian 
case of KLB v British Columbia 2003 SCC 51, [2003] 2 SCR 403, (duty to protect welfare of foster chil-
dren under supervision of public authority). See also Marshall v Wm Sharp & Sons Ltd 1991 SLT 114, in 
which the distinction is made with regard to the employer’s duty to maintain safety in the workplace.
22 For a recent unsuccessful attempt to extend the category see A (A Child) v Ministry of Defence [2005] 
QB 183.
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contractor.23 There is Scots and English authority to suggest that a custodier to whom 
an item has been consigned has a non-delegable duty to ensure its safekeeping and is 
therefore liable if it is damaged or misappropriated by an employee.24 In addition, it 
would appear that landowners have a non-delegable duty to prevent nuisance to their 
neighbours due to works on their property.25 And there is further authority, directly 
relevant here, from the High Court of Australia. The case of New South Wales v 
Lepore,26 cited in M v Hendron, indicates that non-delegable duties may in principle 
be imposed upon public authorities with regard to the safety of pupils at schools in 
their charge. 
One issue which caused the court diffi culty in New South Wales v Lepore was 
whether an authority’s duties might extend to the situation where the claimant had 
been injured by intentional wrongdoing – indeed criminal actions – on the part of 
employees, or whether the authority was required only to exercise reasonable care.27 
However, the case-law in Scotland and England leaves little question that such duties 
may encompass protection against criminal actions as well as carelessness.28 Indeed, 
Lady Paton accepted that such duties might be found in this context and might bind 
an authority even where there had been no fault on its part.29 
 Lady Paton’s recognition of the concept of non-delegable duties was based on her 
reading of the “developing jurisprudence”, “underlying policy reasons”, and, more 
specifi cally, on “the reasoning of the House of Lords in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd”.30 
And indeed the policy justifi cations invoked in Lister to support the extension of vicar-
ious liability might apply equally, if not more appropriately, to non-delegable duties. 
The following passage, for example, is found in Lord Steyn’s judgement, explaining 
the overruling of Trotman:31 
The reality was that the county council were responsible for the care of the vulnerable 
children and employed the deputy headmaster to carry out that duty on its behalf. And 
the sexual abuse took place while the employee was engaged in duties at the very time 
23 The concept was originally applied in this context as a means of allowing employees to recover when 
the common employment doctrine might otherwise have left them without a remedy against employers 
after accidents in the workplace (D M Walker, Delict, 2nd edn (1981) 551-553). See, e.g., Wilsons and 
Clyde Coal Co v English 1937 SC (HL) 46.
24 Central Motors (Glasgow) Ltd v Cessnock Garage & Motor Co 1925 SC 796; Morris v CW Martin & 
Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716.
25 Powrie Castle Properties Ltd v Dundee City Council 2001 SCLR 146.
26 [2003] HCA 4. For commentary see P Vines, “Schools’ responsibility for teachers’ sexual assault: non-
delegable duty and vicarious liability” (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 612. (Of the seven 
judges, Callinan J dissented as to the existence of a “unique non-delegable” duty (at para 340).)
27 Gleeson CJ at paras 34ff, and Gummow and Hayne JJ at para 265, took the view that intentional harm by 
the employee did not put the employer in breach of the non-delegable duty of care. McHugh J at para 
163 stated that it did. Gaudron J did not commit herself on the issue, and Kirby J at para 293, reserved 
his position. (Callinan J dissented as to the existence of non-delegable duties.)
28 E.g. Central Motors (Glasgow) Ltd v Cessnock Garage & Motor Co 1925 SC 796; Morris v CW Martin 
& Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716. On this point, see N J McBride and R Bagshaw, Tort Law 2nd edn (2005) 
232-233. 
29 At para 113. 
30 At para 113. 
31 Para 25.
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and place demanded by his employment. The connection between the employment and 
the torts was very close. 
Similarly Lord Hoffmann explained: 32 
The school was responsible for the care and welfare of the boys. It entrusted that 
responsibility to the warden. He was employed to discharge the school’s responsibility 
to the boys. For this purpose the school entrusted them to his care.
On the other hand, the reasoning applied in Lister does not send clear signals as 
to the existence of non-delegable duties as a basis of liability separate from vicarious 
liability. All of the judgments in Lister concluded with a fi nding of vicarious liability 
based upon the close and direct connection between the care-worker’s employment 
and the abuse perpetrated upon the claimants. None founded the defendant’s duty 
in terms of an independent non-delegable duty of care on the part of the employer, 
although, as Tony Weir has commented, “the speeches in Lister modulate vertigi-
nously between these two grounds of liability, which are quite distinct and should 
be kept so”.33 Their Lordships looked in some detail at the relationship between the 
school and the abused children, and in doing so they applied, in varying degrees, the 
terminology of non-delegable duties. But their purpose in doing so was not in the end to 
establish whether the employer was under a free-standing direct duty to the children, but 
to consider whether in policy terms it was fair and just to fi nd the employer vicariously 
liable for the employee’s breach of duty.34 Thus the reasoning applied in Lister, left the 
boundaries between vicarious liability and non-delegable duties in some confusion. It is 
therefore a welcome aspect of M v Hendron that it makes the distinction clearly. 
And indeed once the difference between the two concepts is suffi ciently focused it 
is possible to ask a further important question: would application of the non-delegable 
duties doctrine in this context achieve the policy objectives identifi ed in Lister equally well, 
but without the vagueness and uncertainty of the “close and direct” connection test for 
vicarious liability? As Gaudron J stated in Lepore v New South Wales:35
As a matter of legal policy, there is no advantage and considerable disadvantage in 
holding a person vicariously liable in circumstances in which he or she is directly liable 
because of a breach of his or her personal or non-delegable duty, as was the case in 
Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co36 and, also, in Morris v C W Martin & Sons Ltd.37 That 
course is likely to lead the persons concerned to think, erroneously, that they have been 
held liable without fault on their part. Further, it seems at least arguable, in the case of 
32 Para 82.
33 Casebook on Tort, 10th edn (2004) 292.
34 E.g. Lord Clyde at paras 46 and 50; Lord Hobhouse at paras 54-55; Lord Millett at paras 79 and 80. 
In this connection see also the judgment of Lord Wheatley (IH) in Williams v Hemphill 1966 SC (HL) 
31 at 41. (An authorised passenger was injured travelling in the defender’s lorry while the driver made 
an unauthorised detour. The pursuer had been brought into “neighbourhood” with the defenders who 
thereby came under an obligation to him to take reasonable care to see that he was transported in safety, 
but the employer was found vicariously, not directly, liable.)
35 Para 127. But cf Kirby J at para 295, suggesting that non-delegable duties should be restricted to cases 
where “the broader basis of vicarious liability” did not apply.
36 [1912] AC 716.
37 [1966] 1 QB 716.
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those who are young or especially vulnerable, that they are better protected by identi-
fi cation of the content of the duty of care that is owed to them by those authorities and 
institutions that have assumed responsibility for their welfare than by the imposition of 
vicarious liability for the deliberate criminal acts of their employees.
E. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND DIRECT FAULT-BASED LIABILITY
Recent cases concerning abuse in institutional care have raised concern as to the means 
of ensuring appropriate redress for victims. A question left open by Lister is why the 
response in the common law has been to push forward the boundaries of vicarious 
liability rather than by confronting issues of non-delegable duties or indeed primary 
fault-based liability on the part of the institutions and the authorities engaged in super-
vision of institutional care. From this point of view it is signifi cant that in M v Hendron 
Lady Paton found that there was a suffi cient case to allow inquiry into whether the 
SED had failed, in primary duty to investigate serious concerns as to the running of 
the school.38 
Often the standard of care expected of a public authority in such a supervisory 
role has been construed restrictively, and there is reluctance to penalise a failure to 
intervene. Harm which has arisen out of a single incident tends to be regarded as 
unforeseeable39 (an approach which stems perhaps from a fear of encouraging “defen-
sive” and unhelpful over-regulation40). But even where harm has been sustained over 
a prolonged period, liability is rarely found. The locus classicus on the liability of local 
authorities in relation to failures in child care is of course X (Minors) v Bedfordshire 
County Council,41 and in particular the statement by Lord Browne-Wilkinson on the 
common law duty of care arising from the performance, or non-performance, of a statutory 
duty in this context.42 Broadly speaking, the three-stage test as set out in Caparo Industries 
Plc v Dickman43 of a) foreseeability; b) proximity; and c) justness and reasonableness, 
must be satisfi ed if a duty of care is to be recognised and public policy considerations 
mean that the third element is often problematic. However, it is signifi cant that one 
of the specifi c contexts identifi ed by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in which the duty might 
exist is where a public authority was in charge of the running of a school, pursuant 
to its statutory duties: “in such latter case a common law duty to take reasonable 
care for the physical safety of the pupils will arise”.44 Indeed it appears to have been 
38 Paras 102-104. 
39 See Ahmed v City of Glasgow Council 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 153 (pupil assaulted by other pupil in class-
room while teacher was absent) in which the pleading concerning fault by the education authority were 
repelled at an early stage; Partington v London Borough of Wandsworth [1990] Fam Law 468 (autistic 
teenager under supervision of a local education authority attacked a member of the public) in which the 
authority was held to have acted reasonably in the circumstances.
40 A fear perhaps refl ected in the arguably redundant s 1 of the Compensation Bill (for England and Wales) 
currently before the UK Parliament. 
41 [1995] 2 AC 633, and see now Z v UK, note 48 below. For commentary on developments subsequent to 
X (Minors) see M Johnson, “Public authority liability in child abuse compensation claims” 2004 Journal 
of Personal Injury Law 28. 
42 At 730H-731A.
43 [1990] 2 AC 605.
44 At 735.
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accepted in English case-law (not cited in M v Hendron) since X(Minors) that a failure 
adequately to supervise residential care can give rise to fault-based liability on the part 
of the relevant local authority.45 
F. POST SCRIPT: THE ECHR
Had the events of M v Hendron taken place forty years later, it might further have been 
argued that the SED – or its successor – was under an obligation as a public authority46 
under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights to protect the rights of 
the children against inhuman or degrading treatment. Issues of proportionality must 
of course be considered, but parallels may be drawn with the criteria used in the 
common law to fi nd that it is fair just and reasonable to impose a positive duty of care 
in this context.47 Moreover, the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Z v UK48 signals the onerous nature of the obligation placed on public authorities to 
safeguard the Article 3 rights of children under their supervision, whether or not in 
residential institutions. 
Elspeth Reid
University of Edinburgh
45 See Various Claimants v Flintshire CC, unreported, QBD, 26 July 2000 (aff’d [2001] PIQR Q9) per 
Scott Baker J at para 16: “the Defendants’ poor supervision did render it likely that the children would 
be abused by the staff, and it is by this route that in my judgment liability can be established”. This case 
refers also to the unreported judgement of Potts J in Lesiakowski v Leicestershire CC, unreported, 
QBD, 2 April 1996 (cited also by Johnson, note 41 above, at 30).
46 Human Rights Act 1998, s 6.
47 Text at note 44 above. On the overlap between proportionality and criteria to determine what is fair, just, 
and reasonable, see, by way of contrast, Mitchell v Glasgow City Council 2005 SLT 1100 where the issue 
was whether the local authority’s failure to intervene to protect a tenant’s rights under Art 2 gave rise to 
a claim in damages. Lord Bracadale held that it would not be fair, just or reasonable to impose upon the 
Council a positive duty to intervene. Similarly in relation to the Convention right he concluded: “That 
obligation is not to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. The test to be 
applied is whether the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and 
immediate risk… and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged 
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk” (para 71).
48 (2002) 34 EHRR 3.
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